and the bystanding farmer:
Harmonizing patent law and common law on the technological frontier

By Paul J. Heald, Post Professor of Law,
and James Charles Smith, Martin Chair of Law

armers who do not want to plant genetically
modified crops in the United States have two serious problems. First, windblown genetically modified
pollen from the fields of neighboring farmers often
contaminates their fields.
For example, a genetically modified corn variety named “StarLink”
was planted in approximately one percent of cornfields in Iowa in
1998. By the year 2000, more than half of the fields in that state
showed some signs of genetic contamination.
Because this variety was only approved by the FDA for animal
consumption, products meant for humans containing the StarLink
genetic material had to be recalled. Two biotech companies eventually settled one of the related StarLink suits for more than $110
million.
Neither of the authors of this article are organic food nuts but, as
commercial lawyers, we are concerned by the situation facing farmers in the United States who want to grow non-genetically modified
(non-GMO) crops for buyers in jurisdictions that heavily regulate
or forbid the sale of genetically modified food products, like the
European Union or Japan, or who sell to purveyors of organic food
products in the United States or elsewhere.
The market for non-GMO crops overseas is enormous, but it is
very substantial in the United States as well. Most supermarkets have
an organic section now, and major suppliers such as Gerber baby
food and Frito-Lay corn chips buy only non-GMO raw materials.
Not surprisingly, non-GMO food stuffs often command a premium price. Recent studies show grocery store premiums for organic
vegetables are 120 percent higher and Japanese students are willing
to pay at least 33 percent more for organic soybean oil. Additionally,
one recent check of the commodities market showed non-GMO
corn selling for $4 per bushel while GMO corn sold for $1.67 per
bushel.
Non-GMO farmers, however, run the constant risk of their crops
being contaminated by pollen from patented genetically modified
plants. If a farmer has a forward contract for non-GMO corn for
sale in Europe, and her corn fields are pollinated by a neighbor’s
genetically modified crop, then the farmer will have to breach her
contract with the European buyer and possibly have to pay damages.
At best, the anticipated premium from selling the non-GMO crop
will be lost.
More importantly, the non-GMO farmer may find herself unable
to sell the contaminated crop at all, because if her plants are found to
contain patented cell structures claimed by the patentee of the GMO
corn, then the farmer is arguably a patent infringer and selling her
crop without the patentee’s permission will be fraught with risk.
This is the second problem that concerns us – the possibility that
a patent on a GMO seed or pollen can be used to render bystanding
non-GMO farmers liable for patent infringement when their crops
are contaminated.
Although the factual problem of contamination through pollen
drift is very real for non-GMO farmers, the danger posed by patent
law seems far-fetched to some, given that in most areas of the law
innocent bystanders have a complete defense.
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Patent Law Liability
Patent law, however, is based on the
concept of strict liability. If a department store
sells an infringing product, for example, the
store is liable whether it knew the product was
infringing or not. A scientist working in her
lab is guilty of patent infringement even if she
has no idea the new compound she has just
synthesized happens to read on the claims of
an existing patent.
Although the Canadian Supreme Court
ducked the innocence issue in the famous
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser case1,
the court did find that a bystanding
farmer could be liable for patent infringement stemming from windblown GMO
pollen.
Monsanto, the world’s leading agricultural biotech corporation, providing
over 90 percent of the technology for
the world’s GMO crops, has been particularly active in using patent law to
police anyone it finds to be growing its
patented plants.
In fact, Monsanto’s lead in its industry is certainly due in part to its use
of forceful investigations and prosecutions against those it suspects of patent infringement, regardless of whether
such infringers are willful or are even
aware of their alleged infringement.
In short, Monsanto is in the unique
position of being able to take a problem
that it created – the contamination of nonGMO plants by pollen drift from GMO plants – and use
it to its advantage by prosecuting those bystanding farmers whose
crops become contaminated.
Monsanto devotes a large amount of its resources to pursuing
patent infringers – the company has 75 full-time employees and $10
million per year devoted to the prosecutions and investigations.
It is believed that actions and investigations by Monsanto against
farmers number into the thousands, with most settling outside of
court in confidential agreements. Generally, the company initiates
between 500 and 600 new investigations each year, many of which
are the result of tips called in to the company’s toll-free hotline.
There have been approximately 90 actual lawsuits filed by
Monsanto involving 147 farmers and 39 farm companies in 25
different states. While Monsanto has taken the lead in plant patent
litigation, farmers can be sure that other biotech companies will soon
follow suit.
It is helpful to consider an actual Monsanto patent. U.S. Patent
No. 6,114,610 “relates to the seeds of inbred corn line ASG27, to
the plants of inbred corn line ASG27 and to methods for producing
a corn plant produced by crossing the inbred line ASG27 with itself
or another corn line [and] to hybrid corn seeds and plants produced
by crossing the inbred line ASG27 with another corn line.”
In addition to claiming the plant, its seeds, hybrid plants and
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hybrid seeds, the patent covers the pollen of the plant, the method patent monopoly by suing a farmer whose organic fields have been
for cross-breeding a hybrid and various gene conversions of the contaminated with Round-Up Ready pollen.
patented plant.
Lastly, the ancient equitable defense of volenti non fit injuria,
Given the broad scope of Monsanto’s claims, it is relatively easy to roughly translated as “he who suffers damage through his own fault
see how a bystanding farmer might unwittingly violate the patentee’s has no right to complain of it,”3 could potentially be invoked. The
exclusive statutory rights to use, make and sell the patented inven- doctrine denies relief to those responsible for harming their own
tion.
interests.
If the wind blows the patented pollen onto a bystanding farmer’s
In the case of pollen drift, a strong argument can be made that
corn plants and those plants are pollinated, then the farmer has argu- the patented genetic material has literally been cast to the winds by
ably used the pollen in violation of the Monsanto patent.
the patentee and its licensed distributors.
The pollinated plants would then produce hybrid seeds in potenWould it not be inequitable for them to claim to be damaged
tial violation of Monsanto’s method patent for hybridization and its by the fully anticipated natural distribution of their patented invenproduct patent for hybrid seeds.
tion?
If the plants are harvested and the hybrid seed sold, a further
This defense has not yet been applied in a patent infringement
violation of Monsanto’s right to sell the
suit, but the unique facts of the pollen
patented seeds may occur.
drift scenario may make its application
And, finally, if hybrid seeds are saved
appropriate.
and replanted, a further infringing use
Offensive Legal
Given the broad scope of
could be alleged.
Solutions
We propose two legal solutions to the
State tort law is likely to grant signifiplight of the bystanding farmer. The first is
Monsanto’s claims, it is
cant protection to bystanding farmers who
defensive: Identifying possible defenses to
suffer harm when their crops are pollinated
patent infringement under federal law. The
from GMO crops.
relatively easy to see how
second is offensive: Identifying possible
The action for private nuisance provides
causes of action against genetic polluters
the most fertile ground for analysis, along
under state law.
a bystanding farmer might
with strict liability, which in this context
Defensive Legal
may be viewed as a species of nuisance or as
a freestanding tort.
Solutions
unwittingly violate the
Other tort theories having some plauThe most promising defenses for
sibility consist of trespass to land, public
the bystanding farmer are the doctrine
patentee’s exclusive
nuisance, negligence and interference with
of unclean hands, patent misuse and the
personal property (trespass to goods or
ancient defense of volenti non fit injuria.
conversion).
The unclean hands doctrine provides
statutory rights to use,
Nuisance is often said to be a relative
a defense when the alleged victim of the
concept. It balances the gravity of the injury
infringement (here the patentee) also
make and sell the
to the plaintiff against the utility of the
took part in the wrongdoing (allowing
defendant’s conduct to arrive at a judgment
the unwanted spread of patented genetic
as to whether a nuisance has taken place.
material).
patented invention.
The defendant’s conduct is found to be
As Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S.
a nuisance if it is said to be unreasonable,
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considering all the facts and circumstances,
asserted in Smithkline Beechum Corp. v.
Apotex Corp.: “I believe that as a matter of fundamental principle it including the plaintiff’s position.
Nuisance, however, has two other zones, lying on opposite sides
must be an equitable defense to a charge of patent infringement that
of the balancing core. Both of these zones give us bright-line rules.
the patentee caused the infringement.”2
The first zone is what we might call nuisance immunity. Certain
Since the alleged wrong committed by the bystanding farmer is
directly traceable to the patentee’s actions, the unclean hands defense landowner activities are regarded as sufficiently beneficial or benign
that courts virtually never castigate them as nuisances.
may be available.
Second, there is the nuisance per se doctrine. Certain conduct,
The patent misuse defense punishes patentees who try to extend
their patent beyond its lawful scope. Take, for example, the patent on perceived as generally undesirable or high risk, is always wrongful.
“Round-Up Ready” seeds. This invention allows the farmer to plant Nuisance per se is properly seen as a species of strict liability, even
seeds and then spray the herbicide Round-Up on the growing plants though many courts choose not to discuss it in those terms.
Nuisance immunity shelters different types of landowner activito kill weeds without harming the young crops.
One can argue that the subject of the monopoly inherent in the ties, including putting up a building that blocks a neighbor’s view or
patent grant on Round-Up Ready seed products is farmers who want access to air and light or that is ugly, causing “aesthetic harm.”
A line of old noxious weed cases approaches our problem of
to spray Round-Up on their crops.
An organic farmer who uses no herbicides is not in the market for GMO pollen drift. These cases immunized owners of weed-infested
such seeds. It may be an act of patent misuse to attempt to extend the properties from nuisance liability when the weeds germinated and
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Martin Chair Jim Smith (left) discusses some legal issues regarding the growth of genetically modified crops with Post Professor Paul Heald. Photo by Terry Allen.

“polluted” nearby crops. In a representative case, Harndon v. Stultz,
an Iowa court held that a farmer whose lands were “greatly damaged”
by a cocklebur infestation had no cause of action.4
At first blush, the noxious plant cases might support immunizing
the GMO crop defendants from liability. Both fact patterns involve
an invasion by reproductive parts of plants: seeds and pollen.
There are, however, two critical distinctions. First, most courts
that have excused the weed grower emphasized that the plants grew
naturally or accidentally on the defendant’s land. The defendant did
not purposely plant them. With respect to the bystanding farmer, the
prototypical defendant has intentionally planted the GMO crops.
Second, in the noxious plant cases, as in standard pollution cases,
the defendant polluter does not assert an ownership interest in the
emitted material. The polluter owned the substances prior to their
escape, but abandoned them when they left the polluter’s land.
Standard pollutants like weed seeds and pollen, leaves, dirt or
smoke have no value, but if a victim of pollution can “harvest the
pollution,” she is free to keep the substance.
Suppose a landowner’s operations propitiously emit gold dust
through the air or water, a neighbor who captures the dust will own
it.
Conversely, retained ownership of a thing that enters a neighbor’s
tract generally makes the owner liable for damages. This is why owners of domesticated animals are usually strictly liable when they stray
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and why, in contrast, landowners are not liable if unconstrained wild
animals exit their land and damage a neighbor’s land.
In the GMO pollination situation, the defendant who holds a
valid patent is like the owner of straying domestic animals.
In nuisance’s large middle zone, courts and fact finders balance a
number of factors to determine which party has a property entitlement.
In the 19th century, American courts departed from a view
of nuisance that held a defendant liable for all substantial harms
caused by its invasions. With the rise of industrialization, judges
became reluctant to assess damages against emerging commercial
enterprises.
The modern approach is reflected by the Restatement of Torts
(Second), which calls for an evaluation of a total of eight factors
bearing on the gravity of the plaintiff’s harm and the utility of the
defendant’s conduct.
The restatement approach may have the virtue of being flexible
and adaptable, but it does not compel any particular result in any
imaginable nuisance dispute.
Such legal indeterminacy has one highly important consequence
for GMO nuisance litigation. In almost every case of alleged GMO
pollen damage, fact finding will be necessary. Cases will survive
motions for summary judgment and proceed to the jury (or to the
court as fact finder if there is no jury).
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“We conclude that bystanding farmers ought to fare
well in litigation with GMO patent holders and persons
engaged in GMO agriculture. The ultimate goal of
patent law is diversity. ”
- Post Professor Paul Heald and
Martin Chair Jim Smith

Bystanding farmers are likely to assert strict liability claims against
GMO defendants.
Under modern tort law, the issue turns on whether the production and use of GMO goods would constitute an “inherently dangerous” or “ultra hazardous” activity.
Pesticide drift cases provide an analogy. Two of the leading cases,
one from Washington and the other from Wisconsin, reached opposite conclusions.
In the Washington case, Langan v. Valicopters5, pesticides applied
by helicopter drifted across a farm boundary, falling on the plaintiff’s
organic crops. The plaintiff recovered damages for the market value
of the crops based on strict liability. The court emphasized that pesticide drift is unpredictable, cannot be fully controlled by the exercise of reasonable care and will cause significant harm if it contacts
organic crops.
In the Wisconsin case, Bennett v. Larsen Co.6, a corn farmer
sprayed his fields with pesticides to combat corn borers and earworms. The plaintiffs were beekeepers, with some of their hives
located near the cornfields. The pesticide labels indicated that the
product might kill honeybees in substantial numbers. This happened, but the court rejected strict liability, requiring that the beekeepers prove negligence.
Those jurisdictions that impose strict liability on pesticide
applicators, like Washington, would be more likely to hold GMO
producers strictly liable than those jurisdictions, like Wisconsin, that
refuse to do so.
One explanation for the divergence between Washington and

Wisconsin lies in the way they view the consideration of the “common usage” factor – an activity is not “abnormally dangerous” so as
to give rise to strict liability if it is “a matter of common usage.”7
The Wisconsin court asked whether applying pesticides is a
common practice among agriculturalists in the community, but the
Washington court asked whether crop dusting is a common practice
among the general population in the community (like driving a car).
Such jurisdictions might also diverge in their views of whether GMO
farming constitutes a common practice.

Conclusion
We conclude that bystanding farmers ought to fare well in
litigation with GMO patent holders and persons engaged in GMO
agriculture. The ultimate goal of patent law is diversity.
As consumers, we hope to have more products to choose from
because of the incentives that patent law provides.
It is not surprising, therefore, that patent law provides an impressive laundry list of defenses available to farmers who are the victims
of unwanted pollen drift.
The common law here works hand-in-hand with patent law to
ensure that a farmer’s choices are respected.
Strong arguments can be made that positive economic relief
should be afforded to farmers who can show the value of their crop
has been diminished due to pollen drift.
GMO pollen drift is a new, high-tech problem, but well-established principles of federal and state law appear prepared to offer
viable low-tech solutions.
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